Supreme Court, U.S.
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No. 95-1501

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1995

MICHAEL B. KING,

Petitioner,

vs.

CLAYTON COUNTY COMMISSION, TEE CASSELLS, SCOTT LOVETT, and DAVID G. LEMACKS,

Respondents.

Petition For Writ Of Certiorari To The United States Court Of Appeals For The Eleventh Circuit

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

THEODORE FREEMAN, ESQ.
DREW, ECKL & FARNHAM
880 West Peachtree Street
Post Office Box 7600
Atlanta, Georgia 30357
(404) 885-1400
Counsel of Record for Respondents

COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO., (800) 225-6964
OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831

50 pp

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

I. Whether petitioner's failure to raise an issue before the district court and the Eleventh Circuit precludes him from seeking this Court's consideration of that issue. (Question Number 1 in the Petition for Writ of Certiorari.)

II. Whether the district court clearly abused its discretion in denying petitioner's motion for new trial where the jury instructions reflected the pertinent substantive law and showed no tendency to confuse or mislead the jury with respect to the applicable principles of law. (Questions Number 2 and 3 in the Petition for Writ of Certiorari.)

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OPINIONS AND JUDGMENT BELOW

Within the Appendix to the Petition for Writ of Certiorari petitioner has provided what purports to be the charge to the jury of the Honorable Jack T. Camp, Judge, United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia [hereinafter referred to as the "district court"] on March 18, 1994. Petitioner also includes in the Appendix what purports to be the district court's order entered June 28, 1994, denying petitioner's motion for new trial. Additionally, petitioner includes in the Appendix what purports to be the August 24, 1995 decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit [hereinafter referred to as the "Eleventh Circuit"] in *King v. Clayton County Commission, et al.*, No. 94-8870, (per curiam) (11th Cir., August 24, 1995) and the Judgment entered by the Eleventh Circuit that same date. Finally, petitioner includes in the Appendix the Eleventh Circuit's per curiam denial of petitioner's Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing en banc, dated December 14, 1995.

Because petitioner's Appendices B through E are not full, complete and accurate, respondents have provided corrected copies at Appendices A through D hereto.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

Respondents agree with petitioner's Statement of Jurisdiction.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Respondents agree that this action involves a claim under the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, as well as 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioner Michael B. King is an attorney and was one (1) of the two (2) plaintiffs in the district court. Petitioner is the father of Michael B. King, Jr., the other plaintiff in the district court. Michael B. King and Michael B. King, Jr. ("the Kings") brought this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(3) and 1988, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, Atlanta Division, on May 23, 1991, alleging violations of their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. (R1-1-1, *et seq.*) Specifically, the Kings alleged that Clayton County deputies sheriff Lovett and Cassells conducted an illegal search of their home and illegally seized plaintiff Michael B. King, Jr. (*Id.*)

Originally named as defendants were the Clayton County Commission; Tee Cassells, individually and in his official capacity as deputy with the Clayton County Sheriff's Department; John Doe, individually and in his official capacity as deputy with the Clayton County Sheriff's Department; and David G. Lemacks, individually and in his official capacity as Sheriff of Clayton County. (*Id.*) Subsequently, Scott Lovett was identified as the defendant originally referred to as "John Doe."

After extensive discovery, defendants filed their motion for summary judgment on or about March 12, 1992. (R1-23.) On June 29, 1992, the district court's order was entered granting defendants' motion for summary judgment in part and denying it in part. (R2-33-23.) Summary judgment was granted to all defendants on plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment claim for unlawful seizure, plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment claims, and the claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1985. (R2-33-13, 23.) Summary judgment was also granted to defendants Clayton County Commission and David G. Lemacks on all claims. (R2-33-19, 22.) The trial court, however, found that material questions of fact existed with regard to the constitutionality of the search of the Kings' home and denied summary judgment to defendants Cassells and Lovett on the Fourth Amendment search claim. (R2-33-9.)

From March 16-18, 1994, a jury trial of the Kings' Fourth Amendment claim of an unconstitutional search was conducted before the Honorable Jack T. Camp. (R5; R6; R7.) At commencement of trial, the only remaining defendants were deputies Cassells and Lovett, both individually and in their official capacities. (*Id.*)

At the conclusion of the plaintiffs' case, defendants' motion for judgment on the law was granted and the court ruled that a March 6, 1989 arrest order issued by Judge Russell Carlisle constituted a valid arrest warrant. (R6-247-248.) The district court also granted defendants' motion for judgment on the law as to Lovett and Cassells in their official capacities, ruling that there was not sufficient evidence to proceed against them in their official capacities but only in their individual capacities. (R6-256.)

At the conclusion of plaintiffs' case, the Kings moved for a directed verdict, arguing that Lovett and Cassells lacked probable cause to enter and search their home and lacked an exigent reason for entry and search as a matter of law. (R6-252-255.) Plaintiffs' motion was denied. At the same time, the trial court advised plaintiffs that, "[o]f course, you may renew at the end of all of the evidence after defendant has presented defendants' case." (R6-255.)

At the close of *all* the evidence, plaintiffs did *not* renew their motion for directed verdict nor did they make any other motion. (R6-367.) Indeed, in arguing against defense motions made at the end of all evidence, it was the Kings' position that jury issues existed regarding the question of exigent circumstances. Petitioner, acting *pro se*, stated, "I think, you know, that the testimony of these witnesses is sufficient enough and competent enough to raise issues for the jury to determine as to the exigent circumstances." (R6-366.)

On March 18, 1994, after approximately 45 minutes of deliberation, the jury returned a verdict for defendants. (R7-416-418; R4-65.) Judgment was entered in favor of defendants on March 21, 1994. (R4-70.) On April 1, 1994, plaintiffs' motion for new trial was filed. (R4-71.) The trial court denied the Kings' motion for new trial in its order filed June 28, 1994, Appendix C hereto. (R4-76-1.) On July 27, 1994, plaintiffs filed their notice of appeal. (R4-77.)

On August 24, 1995, the Eleventh Circuit entered its Order affirming the district court's rulings. *King v. Clayton County Commission, et al.*, No. 94-8870 (per curiam)

(11th Cir., August 24, 1995), Appendix B hereto. Judgment was entered by the Eleventh Circuit that same date. *See* Appendix A hereto.

The pertinent facts are as follows: On May 22, 1989, Clayton County sheriff's deputies John Chapman and Lucretia Chitwood (not named as defendants in this case) received an arrest order, a cover sheet, and a citation from the Cobb County Sheriff's Department for one Stevie King. The arrest order against Stevie King was based on his failure to appear in traffic court. Stevie King's address was shown on the arrest order as 5751 Riverdale Road, College Park, Georgia. No apartment number was identified. (R6-259-266.)

On May 22, 1989, Chapman and Chitwood attempted to execute the arrest of Stevie King. Arriving at the 5751 Riverdale Road address, the deputies learned that two different apartment complexes, Kimberly Forest and Huntington Woods, shared that address. (R6-260-261.) In an effort to determine where Stevie King could be found, the deputies first checked with the manager of the Kimberly Forest complex, who advised the deputies that no King was registered at Kimberly Forest. (R6-261.)

The deputies then went to Huntington Woods and checked with the resident manager, who told them someone named Michael King did reside there in Apartment 25-H. (R6-261, 264.) A discussion ensued between the apartment manager and the officers, wherein the manager stated that the King living at the complex was about the same age and description as the description given for Stevie King recited in the Cobb County information. (*Id.*) However, the manager was not sure if Stevie King was

Michael King, or if Stevie King possibly lived with Michael King. The deputies noted the information they obtained on their field notes (also known as a "leads sheet"), returned to the Sheriff's Department and placed the arrest order/documents and the leads sheet back into the system for further processing. (R6-261.)

All of the above-described information was passed on to respondents Lovett and Cassells the next day, May 23, 1989. They went to Apartment 25-H at 5751 Riverdale Road at approximately 8:18 p.m. to attempt execution of the arrest warrant for Stevie King. (R5-43-45.) Upon their arrival at Apartment 25-H on May 23, 1989, Lovett and Cassells found the front door to the apartment unlocked and open. (R5-53, 105.) In their possession, according to Cassells' trial testimony were the following:

> . . . I had a warrant out of Cobb County signed by Judge Carlisle of Cobb County. I also had with the address on the arrest order of 5751 Riverdale Road of a Stevie King. I also had in my possession a Uniform Traffic Citation out of Cobb County with the name of Stevie King with the address of 5751 Riverdale Road, College Park. Also with that was a cover letter state warrant from out of Cobb County with the address of 5751 Riverdale Road, College Park, with the name of Stevie King. Also in my possession was a uniform information sheet which we call a lead sheet. On that was information of a department [sic] number of 25-H, 5751 Riverdale Road, College Park, of a Stevie King.

(R5-100-101.)

The deputies knocked on the door frame, shouting "Sheriff's Department," but nobody answered. (R5-105.)

They knocked again, identifying themselves as Clayton County Sheriff's Department deputies sheriff; still, no one responded. (*Id.*) Cassells went to the back of the building where he observed that all curtains were drawn, the gate closed and locked, and the rear area was "totally secure." (R5-106.) He shouted out, "Clayton County Sheriff's Department" and banged on the gate, but still received no response. (*Id.*)

On returning to the front, Cassells advised Lovett that the back area was secured and curtains drawn so that he could not see inside the apartment. (R5-106.) Cassells testified that because the front door was standing open and the back was secure, he was suspicious either that something was going on inside the apartment or that they had surprised someone during the commission of a crime, particularly given the fact that the neighborhood was a very high-crime area. (R5-107.) Cassells also advised Lovett of his concern that someone might be injured inside the apartment. (R6-290.)

Cassells and Lovett entered the apartment with their guns drawn at a low ready position, continuing to identify themselves as "Sheriff's Department." (R6-291-292.) They made a protective sweep of the downstairs area and then went upstairs to do the same. (*Id.*) The protective sweep consisted of looking in areas where the body of a person could hide, only. They did not open any drawers or cabinets. They did not go through any personal papers that may have been laying on a desk or anywhere in any other room. They did not move or dislodge anything from its place. (R6-294.)

Prior to completing the protective sweep of the upstairs of the apartment, Cassells and Lovett heard a noise from the downstairs area, where they discovered Michael King, Jr. (R6-294.) Cassells and Michael King, Jr. engaged in conversation, during which Cassells asked Michael King, Jr. why he had left the door open, to which Michael King, Jr. replied that he did not have a key. (R6-295.) Cassells gave Michael King, Jr. his business card and wrote the name Stevie King on the back of it. Cassells asked Michael King, Jr. to have his father call Cassells when he came home. (*Id.*) Lovett and Cassells then left. (R6-296.)

ARGUMENT

Rule 10 of the rules of this Court sets forth the basis upon which a writ of certiorari may be granted. The rule reads in pertinent part:

> Review on writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial discretion. A petition for a writ of certiorari will be granted only for compelling reasons. The following, although neither controlling nor fully measuring the Court's discretion, indicate the character of the reasons the Court considers: . . . .
>
> > (c) a state court or a United States court of appeals has decided an important question of federal law that has not been, but should be, settled by this Court, or has decided an important federal question in a way that

> conflicts with relevant decisions of this Court.

Sup. Ct. R. 10.

Respondents have assumed, based upon the content of the petition for writ of certiorari, that subsection (c) of Rule 10 is relied upon by petitioner in support of the instant petition. Apparently, petitioner contends that the Eleventh Circuit, by affirming the district court, has "decided an important federal question in a way that conflicts with relevant decisions of this Court." Sup. Ct. R. 10(c). Those questions seemingly are: (1) whether the Fourth Amendment imposes an absolute ban on warrantless and nonconsensual police searches of citizens' homes for suspects named in traffic court arrest orders; and (2) whether both probable cause and exigent circumstances must exist to justify warrantless and nonconsensual searches of citizens' homes. (Petition for Writ of Certiorari, pp. 6 and 8.)

A. The first question presented by petitioner was not advanced either in the district court or in the Eleventh Circuit and should not be considered for the first time by this Court.

The first question which petitioner asks this Court to review is whether the Fourth Amendment imposes an absolute ban on warrantless and nonconsensual police searches of citizens' homes for suspects named in traffic court arrest orders. (Petition for Writ of Certiorari, pp. i, 6.) However, that question was never raised, briefed or argued below. It was never raised because in this case, the deputies had a warrant, albeit an arrest warrant.

Therefore, this issue should not be considered for the first time by this Court. *See, e.g., Patrick v. Burget*, 486 U.S. 94, 99, n. 5 (1988); *J. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp.*, 451 U.S. 557, 558 (1981); *Youakim v. Miller*, 425 U.S. 231, 234 (1976); *Adickes v. S. H. Kress and Co.*, 398 U.S. 144, 147, n. 2 (1970); *Lawn v. United States*, 355 U.S. 339, 362-63 (1958).

In *Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery*, 349 U.S. 70 (1955), this Court discussed the dimensions of its discretionary review and why cases, such as this one, are not among those for which such review will be granted.

> [W]e have considered anew whether this case is one in which "there are special and important reasons" for granting the writ of certiorari, as required by Supreme Court Rule 19, 28 U.S.C.A.
>
> * * * * *
>
> A federal question raised by a petitioner may be "of substance" in the sense that, abstractly considered, it may present an intellectually interesting and solid problem. But this Court does not sit to satisfy a scholarly interest in such issues. Nor does it sit for the benefit of the particular litigants . . . "Special and important reasons" imply a reach to a problem beyond the academic or episodic. This is especially true where the issues involved reach constitutional dimensions, for then there comes into play regard for the Court's duty to avoid decision of constitutional issues unless avoidance becomes evasion.

Rice, 349 U.S. at 74 (citations omitted).

Applying the rationale of the *Rice* decision to this case, there can be no doubt that this case is not one

presenting "special and important reasons" as required by Rule 10 (formerly Rule 19). Instead, the Court has been asked to decide a question of law not argued by the parties below, not ruled upon by either of the courts below, and not dispositive of the case in any event.

Even if the Court were inclined to accept review of this issue, the case on which petitioner appears to primarily rely, *Welsh v. Wisconsin*, 466 U.S. 740 (1984), is inapplicable to the facts of this case, and neither the district court's nor the Eleventh Circuit's rulings conflict with it in any way. In *Welsh*, police entered the home of an individual (Welsh) suspected of driving under the influence of an intoxicant, who had abandoned his vehicle and walked home after swerving off the roadway and into a field. The police gained entry to the home when Welsh's stepdaughter opened the door, and they arrested Welsh for violating a Wisconsin law that was a civil, nonjailable traffic offense. No warrant of any kind was obtained beforehand which would authorize the entry into Welsh's home. Under those circumstances, this Court held that the warrantless entry of Welsh's home violated the Fourth Amendment.

The facts of this case, however, are vastly different than those in *Welsh*. Again, these deputies had an arrest warrant. As petitioner himself points out, "an arrest warrant founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to enter a dwelling in which the suspect lives when there is reason to believe the suspect is within. *Payton [v. New York*, 455 U.S. 573 (1980)] at 603." (Petition for Writ of Certiorari, p. 7.) *See also Steagald v. U.S.*, 451 U.S. 212, 215, n. 7 (1981). Moreover, the charge for which Stevie King was to be arrested was not a mere

traffic violation, but his failure to appear in court on the charge.

The situation addressed by this Court in *Payton* and *Steagald* is similar to the situation which confronted respondents Cassells and Lovett on May 23, 1989. Respondents were in possession of a valid arrest warrant and reasonably believed that Stevie King lived in apartment 25-H and that he was inside the apartment when they conducted their search. Under those circumstances, the rulings of both the district court and the Eleventh Circuit did not conflict with the prior decisions of this Court.

Petitioner's attempt to raise a new issue before this Court is nothing more than a backdoor attempt to secure review of the district court's denial of his motion for directed verdict. This is amply demonstrated by even a cursory review of petitioner's brief filed in the Eleventh Circuit. The first and second arguments petitioner advanced before the Eleventh Circuit were that Cassells and Lovett lacked either probable cause or exigent circumstances to enter his home as a matter of law, and that the district court, therefore, should have directed a verdict in his favor. (Brief of Appellant, pp. 8-13.)

However, as respondents argued below, and as the Eleventh Circuit recognized in its decision, petitioner did not move for directed verdict at the close of all the evidence. (Brief of Appellees Tee Cassells and Scott Lovett, pp. 16-18.) As a result, the district court's denial of that motion must be upheld if any evidence supported submission of the liability issue to the jury. The Eleventh

Circuit correctly concluded that there was ample evidence with respect to *both* the arrest warrant and emergency aid exceptions to the search warrant requirement to require submission of the issue of liability to the jury.

B. The district court's instructions did not conflict with the decisions of this Court.

At sections 2 and 3 of the petition, petitioner seeks review of the district court's instructions to the jury – both those that it did give as well as those which it did not give. (Petition for Writ of Certiorari, pp. 8-11.)

Contrary to petitioner's argument at page 9 of his petition, the district court did not instruct the jury "that probable cause was one exception to the search warrant requirement and exigent circumstances was another requirement." Rather, the district court specifically charged as follows:

> . . . As previously stated, the Constitution protects every citizen against unreasonable searches, and ordinarily this means a search warrant must be obtained from a judicial officer before any search of a home can be made.
>
> There are, however, certain exceptions to this requirement. One such exception arises when police officers are ordered to effect the arrest of a person suspected of violating the law. Under these circumstances if the officers have a reasonable belief that the suspect lives at the residence and that the suspect is inside, the officers can enter and search the residence for the suspect. To apply this exception you must determine whether defendants reasonably believed that

> Stevie King resided at plaintiff's apartment and was inside the apartment at the time of the search.
>
> Another exception is recognized in emergency situations in which a law enforcement officer, if he has a reasonable and good-faith belief that there is a serious threat to his safety or the safety of someone else, may enter and make a safety inspection for the purposes of insuring or protecting his well-being and the well-being of others. The Constitution does not bar police officers from making a warrantless entry into a private home when they reasonably believe that a person within is in need of immediate aid. You are instructed that the law refers to a reasonable belief that – well, in these instructions I have referred to a reasonable belief and when I have done that, that means facts and circumstances apparent at the time would indicate to a reasonable person that that situation exists.

(R7-402-403.)

The district court also charged the jury:

> . . . Members of the jury, at one point in my instructions I instructed you that I have ruled as a matter of law that defendants possessed a valid arrest warrant for Stevie King on the day of the incident. What I meant to say there was that the arrest warrant for Stevie King, a copy of which has been admitted into evidence, was a valid arrest warrant and I have so ruled as a matter of law.

(R7-411.)

Respondents contend that the district court properly, completely and accurately charged the jury and therefore

did not clearly abuse its discretion in denying plaintiffs' motion for new trial.

While the Constitution generally protects every person against "unreasonable searches," so that ordinarily a search warrant must be obtained from a judicial officer before any search of a home may be made, there are certain exceptions to that requirement. One exception exists where law enforcement officers have been ordered by a judge or magistrate to effect the arrest of someone. Under those circumstances where, as in this case: (1) there is a valid arrest warrant (which the trial court decided on directed verdict and instructed the jury, without objection, R6-247-248); (2) the officers have reason to believe they are entering the suspect's dwelling; and (3) the officers have reason to believe that the suspect is within, then the officers may search the residence for the suspect. *Steagald, supra; Payton, supra.*

Only unreasonable searches are prohibited by the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution. In determining reasonableness, a defendant's conduct must be viewed in the terms of what could be considered reasonable under the circumstances existing, without the benefit of hindsight. *Graham v. Connor,* 490 U.S. 386 (1989). Here, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to believe that the respondents reasonably believed Stevie King lived in apartment 25-H on May 23, 1989 and that he was inside the apartment when they conducted their search. As such, the jury was charged properly as to this issue.

A second exception to the general requirement that a search warrant must be obtained from a judicial officer before any search of a home may be made is in an

emergency situation in which a law enforcement officer, if he has a reasonable belief that a serious threat to his safety or to the safety of others is present, may enter and make a safety inspection for the purpose of insuring or protecting his well being and the well being of others. Thus independent of an arrest-related situation, a warrantless entry/search may be made in the presence of an emergency situation.

In those instances where the "exigent circumstances" involve matters falling within the "emergency aid" exception to the warrant requirement, the only probable cause that is needed is a reasonable belief that an exigent circumstance exists. *Mincey v. Arizona*, 437 U.S. 393 (1978). The Fourth Amendment does not bar such warrantless entries and searches by law enforcement officers who reasonably believe that a person within is in need of immediate aid. The testimony of respondent Cassells reflects such a reasonable belief. (R6-290.)

The trial court's charge clearly included both the emergency aid/exigent circumstances and probable cause components. The instruction neither confused nor misled the jury with respect to the applicable principles of law. The district court did not clearly abuse its discretion.

There was no unfair prejudice to petitioner. The jury was properly instructed on the law of probable cause and exigent circumstances and the jury verdict for respondent was amply supported by the evidence.

In the final analysis, all petitioner is hoping to obtain is a third chance to convince a court that the facts of his case are such that the district court should have directed a verdict in his favor. Respondents submit such a goal is

not among the "special and important reasons" for which review on certiorari was designed. Accordingly, the petition should be denied.

CONCLUSION

The petition for writ of certiorari should be denied in this matter, because the justiciable concerns required by Rule 10 of the rules of this Court are not present. There is no need for this Court to decide the broad question presented by petitioner, because such a decision is not needed to resolve the case now before this Court. An examination of the facts of this case and the applicable law is all that is needed. Petitioner's attempt to transform this case into something that it is not should be rejected.

Accordingly, the petition for writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

DREW, ECKL & FARNHAM

THEODORE FREEMAN
880 West Peachtree Street
Post Office Box 7600
Atlanta, Georgia 30357
(404) 885-1400

Attorneys for Respondents

APPENDIX A

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 94-8870
Non-Argument Calendar

D. C. Docket No. 1:91-cv-1183

MICHAEL B. KING,

and

MICHAEL B. KING, JR.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

Plaintiff,

CLAYTON COUNTY COMMISSION, and TEE CASSELLS, Individually and in his official capacity as deputy with the Clayton County Sheriff's Department, and DAVID G. LEMACKS, Individually and in his official capacity as sheriff of Clayton County, JOHN DOE, Individually and in his official capacity as deputy with the Clayton County Sheriff's Department, and SCOTT LOVETT,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia

Before ANDERSON, BLACK and CARNES, Circuit Judges.

JUDGMENT

This cause came to be heard on the transcript of the record from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, and was taken under submission by the Court upon the record and briefs on file, pursuant to Eleventh Circuit Rule 34-3;

UPON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, it is now hereby ordered and adjudged by this Court that the order of the said District Court appealed from in this cause be and the same is hereby AFFIRMED;

It is further ordered that plaintiff-appellant pay defendants-appellees the costs on appeal to be taxed by the Clerk of this Court.

Entered: August 24, 1995
For the Court: Miguel J. Cortez, Clerk

By: _____
Deputy Clerk

ISSUED AS MANDATE: 12-27-95

APPENDIX B

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 94-8870
Non-Argument Calendar

D. C. Docket No. 1:91-cv-1183

MICHAEL B. KING,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

and

MICHAEL B. KING, JR.,

Plaintiff,

versus

CLAYTON COUNTY COMMISSION, and TEE CASSELLS, Individually and in his official capacity as deputy with the Clayton County Sheriff's Department, and DAVID G. LEMACKS, Individually and in his official capacity as sheriff of Clayton County, JOHN DOE, Individually and in his official capacity as deputy with the Clayton County Sheriff's Department, and SCOTT LOVETT,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia

(August 24, 1995)

Before ANDERSON, BLACK and CARNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Appellant Michael B. King, an attorney proceeding *pro se*, appeals the district court's denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial, and its refusal to give requested jury instructions. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

In May 1989, a state court judge issued an order in Cobb County, Georgia, for the arrest of "Stevie King" for failure to appear and pay a traffic fine. The address listed for Stevie King on the arrest order, traffic citations, and the cover letter accompanying the arrest order was 5751 Riverdale Road, College Park, Georgia. As no apartment number was given, two sheriff's deputies spoke to the manager of the Huntington Woods Apartments, located at 5751 Riverdale Road. The manager indicated that only one tenant with the surname King resided in the complex, in apartment 25-H, although his first name was Michael. One of the deputies testified that the manager believed Appellant fit the general description of Stevie King.

Based on this information, two other sheriff's deputies, Cassells and Lovett, went to apartment 25-H to execute the arrest order on Stevie King. The deputies knocked on the door several times but received no

response. The deputies checked the rear of the apartment and noticed that all the curtains were drawn. They then entered and began to search the apartment with their weapons drawn. At some point during the search, Appellant's son, Michael, Jr., entered the apartment. The deputies questioned Michael, Jr., about his knowledge of Stevie King and left after determining that Stevie King did not reside there.

Thereafter, Appellant and his son, Michael, Jr., filed this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Kings alleged that Cassells and Lovett violated their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by conducting an illegal search of their home while they were not at home.[1] At trial, Appellant made a motion for judgment as a matter of law at the close of his case, arguing that the evidence showed no probable cause for entering and searching the apartment. The court denied the motion, and Appellant failed to renew the motion at the close of all the evidence. During the jury charge conference, Appellant objected to the court's proposed instructions as to the probable cause standard and to the court's refusal to give his requested jury instruction numbers 6, 10, and 12.

The jury found that Cassells and Lovett did not conduct an unreasonable search of King's residence and rendered a verdict in favor of them. Appellant's motion for a new trial was subsequently denied. On appeal, Appellant

---

[1] The complaint also named the Clayton County Commission (Commission) and David Lemacks, the sheriff of Clayton County, and stated a § 1985(3) claim and a § 1983 illegal seizure claim. The district court granted summary judgment as to these two defendants, and as to these two claims.

contends that the district court erred by: (1) failing to grant his motion for directed verdict; (2) incorrectly instructing the jury on probable cause; and (3) refusing to give Appellant's proposed jury instructions.

As to the first issue, Appellant argues that the court should have granted his motion for judgment as a matter of law because, before entering his home, neither Cassells nor Lovett had any information that Stevie King resided in or was inside apartment 25-H. As such, he contends that they lacked probable cause to search his residence. Appellant also argues that the deputies did not have an exigent reason to enter and search his home without a search warrant or his consent.

Absent a motion for judgment as a matter of law at the close of all evidence, this Court reviews the district court's submission of the issue to the jury under the plain error standard to determine whether any evidence supported submission of the issue. *Georgetown Manor, Inc. v. Ethan Allen, Inc.*, 991 F.2d 1533, 1540 (11th Cir. 1993), *rev'd on other grounds*, 47 F.3d 1099 (11th Cir. 1995). As Appellant failed to renew his motion for judgment as a matter of law at the close of all evidence, the ruling must be upheld if any evidence supports submission of the liability issue to the jury.

In the instant case, there was ample evidence to support the submission of the case to the jury on the existence of probable cause and exigent circumstances in that: (1) Cassells and Lovett both testified that the arrest order and other documents in their possession indicated that Stevie King resided at 5751 Riverdale Road; (2) Appellant was the only tenant at that address with the

surname King; (3) Cassells and Lovett, based upon information previously obtained by two other deputies, believed that Appellant fit the general description of Stevie King; and (4) Cassells and Lovett testified that the front door to the apartment was open, and no one responded to their knocks at the door. The district court thus properly denied the motion.

As to Appellant's second contention, he argues that the district court should have granted a new trial because the jury instructions concerning probable cause and exigent circumstances were incomplete, inaccurate, and misleading. He contends that the court erroneously instructed the jury that either probable cause or exigent circumstances justified the warrantless search of his home, when in fact probable cause must exist to support any search. He also claims the court instructed the jury on a subjective, rather than an objective, standard of probable cause.

This Court reviews the district court's denial of a motion for new trial based on erroneous jury instructions for abuse of discretion. *Christopher v. Cutter Laboratories*, 53 F.3d 1184, 1190 (11th Cir. 1995). Thus, this Court must examine the jury instructions in their entirety to determine whether they fairly and adequately addressed the issues and correctly stated the law. *Id.*

A warrantless search of a home will be upheld if both probable cause and exigent circumstances exist. *United States v. Tobin*, 923 F.2d 1506, 1510 (11th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 112 S. Ct. 299 (1991). Probable cause exists, under the totality of the circumstances, when there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be

found in a particular place. *Id.* An exigent situation may arise when there is "a likelihood that delay could cause the escape of a suspect or the destruction of essential evidence, or jeopardize the safety of officers or the public." *United States v. Standridge*, 810 F.2d 1034, 1037 (11th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 107 S. Ct. 2468 (1987).

An arrest warrant alone is an insufficient basis for searching a third party's home for an individual named in the arrest warrant. *See United States v. De Parias*, 805 F.2d 1447, 1457 (11th Cir. 1986), *cert. denied*, 107 S. Ct. 3189 (1987). An arrest warrant issued by a judicial officer and founded on probable cause, however, implicitly carries with it the limited authority to enter a dwelling when an officer has reason to believe that the person named in the warrant resides and is located within the dwelling. *See id.* The Fourth Amendment also prohibits an officer from making a warrantless and non-consensual entry into a suspect's home for purposes of making an arrest, unless exigent circumstances exist. *Cf. Standridge*, 810 F.2d at 1036.

Although the district court did not specifically state that both probable cause and exigent circumstances must exist to support a warrantless search, the court's charge as a whole was an accurate statement of the law. First, the court instructed the jury that the police can search a home to arrest a person named in a warrant, if they reasonably believed the person resided in and was located within the residence. Second, the court stated that an emergency or exigent situation may exist if the officers had a reasonable and good-faith belief of a serious threat to their safety or that of another, or if someone were in need of immediate aid. Third, contrary to Appellant's assertions, the court

instructed the jury on the objective standard of reasonableness when it stated that a reasonable belief exists "if facts and circumstances apparent at the time would indicate to a reasonable person that the situation exists." Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying a new trial on the basis of erroneous jury instructions.

Appellant's third contention on appeal, that the district court erred in refusing to give certain requested jury instructions, is without merit. Specifically, Appellant's proposed jury instruction number 6 was a definition of probable cause; number 10 described factors that indicate exigent circumstances; and number 12 stated that no exigency is created simply because probable cause exists to believe that a crime has been committed.[2]

As previously noted, this Court must examine the jury instructions in their entirety to determine whether they fairly and adequately addressed the issues and correctly state the law. *Christopher*, 53 F.3d at 1190. Even if the court committed error, the appellant must still show prejudice resulting from the failure to give the requested instruction before the judgment will be disturbed on that ground. *Wilkinson v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc.*, 920 F.2d 1560, 1570 (11th Cir. 1991).

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[2] Appellant also contends that the court erred in refusing to give proposed instruction number 11, which stated that exigent circumstances cannot be created by police. He failed, however, to raise this objection at the charge conference, and we will therefore not address it on appeal.

In this case, although the district court did not specifically use the terms "probable cause" or "exigent circumstances," the court's instruction adequately covered the concepts of probable cause and exigent circumstances. Thus, Appellant failed to show that the substance of the requested instructions was not adequately covered or that he suffered any prejudice.

AFFIRMED.

APPENDIX C

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION

MICHAEL B. KING, SR. and MICHAEL B. KING, JR., Plaintiffs, v. TEE CASSELLS, individually and in his official capacity as Deputy Sheriff of Clayton County, and SCOTT LOVETT, individually and in his official capacity as Deputy Sheriff of Clayton County, Defendants.	)	CIVIL ACTION FILE NO. 1:91-CV-1183-JTC

ORDER OF THE COURT

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs' Motion for New Trial [#71] and Plaintiffs' Motion to Stay Payment of Costs [#73]. For the following reasons, Plaintiffs' motion for a new trial is **DENIED** and the motion to stay costs is **GRANTED**.

I. MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

A court may grant a motion for new trial pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a) when the trial was unfair, or the verdict was against the great weight of the evidence. *Ard v. Southeast Forrest Indus.*, 849 F.2d 517 (11th Cir. 1988); *Allstate Ins. Co. v. James*, 845 F.2d 315 (11th Cir. 1988). A motion for new trial may raise questions of law arising

out of substantial errors in the admission or rejection of evidence or the giving or refusing of instructions. *Diane Manufacturing Co. v. Sheffield Indus. Inc.*, 514 F. Supp. 185 (S.D. Fla. 1981), *aff'd*, 685 F.2d 1387 (11th Cir. 1982). In considering a motion for a new trial, the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. *Evans v. H.C. Watkins Memorial Hosp.*, 778 F.2d 1021, 1022 (5th Cir. 1985). In granting a motion for new trial based on the weight of the evidence, the verdict must be against the great weight of the evidence, not just the greater weight of the evidence. *Fondren v. Allstate Ins. CO.* [sic], 790 F.2d 1533, 1535 (11th Cir. 1986). Nor may the court substitute its own credibility choices for the credibility choices of the jury in making the determination. *Id.*

In this case, Plaintiffs argue that the Court erred by not granting their motion for directed verdict, by instructing the jury incorrectly on probable cause and exigent circumstances, and by instructing the jury that Defendants' "arrest order" constituted a valid "arrest warrant."

The Court has carefully considered the evidence produced at trial and the instructions given to the jury. The evidence of record clearly supports the jury's determination that both probable cause and exigent circumstances existed to justify Defendants' entry into Plaintiffs' residence. Moreover, the Court properly charged the jury on probable cause and exigent circumstances in accordance with applicable Supreme Court and Eleventh Circuit law. As to the arrest order, the undisputed testimony of State Court Judge Carlisle is adequate to support the Court's decision to grant Defendants' Rule 50 motion concerning

the validity of his bench warrant. Plaintiffs' motion for a new trial is, therefore, **DENIED**.

II. MOTION TO STAY COSTS

After the Clerk entered judgment on March 21, 1994, Defendants filed a bill of costs in the amount of $1,131.15. Plaintiffs moved for a stay of payment of costs pending review of the motion for a new trial. Defendants consented to the stay, asking that Plaintiffs be required to make payment after the Court decides the pending new trial motion.

Plaintiffs' motion for a stay is **GRANTED**. Plaintiffs' are **ORDERED** to pay the taxed costs, or to file objections if appropriate, within ten days of the entry of this Order.

SO ORDERED, this 24 day of June, 1994.

JACK T. CAMP
UNITED STATES
DISTRICT JUDGE

APPENDIX D

ALL RIGHT, MEMBERS OF THE JURY, YOU HAVE NOW HEARD ALL OF THE EVIDENCE AND IN JUST FEW MOMENTS YOU WILL HEAR THE ARGUMENTS OF THE ATTORNEYS.

IT IS MY DUTY TO GIVE YOU INSTRUCTIONS CONCERNING THE LAW WHICH APPLIES TO THIS CASE. IT IS YOUR DUTY AS JURORS TO FOLLOW THE LAW AS I STATE IT TO YOU, AND TO APPLY THAT LAW TO THE FACTS AS YOU FIND THEM FROM THE EVIDENCE IN THE CASE. YOU ARE NOT TO SINGLE OUT ONE INSTRUCTION ALONE AS STATING THE LAW BUT MOST [sic] CONSIDER THE INSTRUCTIONS AS A WHOLE. NEITHER ARE YOU TO BE CONCERNED WITH THE WISDOM OF ANY RULE OF LAW STATED BY ME. REGARDLESS OF ANY OPINION YOU MAY HAVE AS TO THE WISDOM OR THE CORRECTNESS OF ANY LAW, REGARDLESS OF WHAT YOU THINK AS TO WHAT THE LAW SHOULD BE, IT WOULD BE A VIOLATION OF YOUR SWORN DUTY AS JURORS TO BASE A VERDICT UPON ANY OTHER VIEW OF THE LAW THAN THAT STATED IN THESE INSTRUCTIONS, JUST AS IT WOULD ALSO BE A VIOLATION OF YOUR SWORN DUTY AS JUDGES OF THE FACTS TO BASE A VERDICT UPON ANYTHING OTHER THAN THE EVIDENCE WHICH YOU HAVE HEARD AND WHICH HAS BEEN ADMITTED INTO THIS CASE.

NOW, IN DECIDING THE FACTS OF THIS CASE, YOU MUST NOT BE SWAYED BY BIAS OR PREJUDICE OR FAVOR AS TO ANY PARTY. OUR SYSTEM OF LAW

DOES NOT PERMIT JURORS TO BE GOVERNED BY PREJUDICE OR SYMPATHY OR PUBLIC OPINION. BOTH THE PARTIES AND THE PUBLIC EXPECT THAT YOU WILL CAREFULLY AND IMPARTIALLY CONSIDER ALL OF THE EVIDENCE IN THE CASE, FOLLOW THE LAW AS STATED IN THESE INSTRUCTIONS, AND REACH A JUST VERDICT REGARDLESS OF THE CONSEQUENCES.

FURTHERMORE, THIS CASE SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AND DECIDED BY YOU AS AN ACTION BETWEEN PERSONS OF EQUAL STANDING IN THE COMMUNITY, HOLDING THE SAME OR SIMILAR STATIONS IN LIFE. THE LAW IS NO RESPECTER OF PERSONS, AND ALL PERSONS STAND EQUAL BEFORE THE LAW AND ARE ENTITLED TO BE DEALT WITH AS EQUAL IN A COURT OF JUSTICE.

NOW, AS I STATED, IT IS YOUR DUTY TO DETERMINE THE FACTS, AND IN DOING SO YOU MAY CONSIDER ONLY THE EVIDENCE I HAVE ADMITTED IN THE CASE.

THE TERM "EVIDENCE" INCLUDES THE SWORN TESTIMONY OF THE WITNESSES AND THE EXHIBITS WHICH HAVE BEEN ADMITTED INTO THE RECORD.

REMEMBER THAT ANY STATEMENTS, OBJECTIONS OR ARGUMENTS MADE BY THE LAWYERS ARE NOT EVIDENCE IN THE CASE. THE FUNCTION OF THE LAWYERS IS TO POINT OUT THOSE THINGS THAT ARE MOST SIGNIFICANT OR MOST HELPFUL TO THEIR SIDE OF THE CASE, AND IN SO DOING TO CALL YOUR ATTENTION TO CERTAIN FACTS OR INFERENCES THAT MIGHT OTHERWISE ESCAPE

YOUR NOTICE. IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, HOWEVER, IT IS YOUR OWN RECOLLECTION AND INTERPRETATION OF THE EVIDENCE THAT CONTROLS IN THE CASE. SIMPLY PUT, WHAT THE LAWYERS SAY IS NOT BINDING UPON YOU.

SO, WHILE YOU SHOULD CONSIDER ONLY THE EVIDENCE IN THE CASE AND NOT SPECULATE AS TO ANY MATERIAL ISSUE, YOU ARE PERMITTED TO DRAW SUCH REASONABLE INFERENCES FROM THE TESTIMONY AND EXHIBITS AS YOU FEEL ARE JUSTIFIED IN THE LIGHT OF COMMON EXPERIENCE. IN OTHER WORDS, YOU MAY MAKE DEDUCTIONS AND REACH CONCLUSIONS WHICH REASON AND COMMON SENSE LEAD YOU TO DRAW FROM THE TESTIMONY AND EVIDENCE IN THE CASE.

NOW, THERE ARE GENERALLY SPEAKING TWO TYPES OF EVIDENCE FROM WHICH A JURY MAY PROPERLY FIND THE TRUTH AS TO THE FACTS OF THE CASE. ONE IS DIRECT EVIDENCE. DIRECT EVIDENCE WOULD BE THE TESTIMONY OF ONE WHO HAS PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF A FACT SUCH AS AN EYEWITNESS. THE OTHER IS CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. NOW THAT IS PROOF OF A CHAIN OF CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH POINT TO THE EXISTENCE OR NONEXISTENCE OF CERTAIN FACTS. AS A GENERAL RULE, THE LAW MAKES NO DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE WEIGHT THAT YOU SHOULD GIVE TO EITHER DIRECT OR CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE; IT SIMPLY REQUIRES THAT YOU FIND THE FACTS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE EVIDENCE IN THE CASE, BOTH DIRECT AND CIRCUMSTANTIAL.

I HAVE SAID YOU MUST CONSIDER ALL OF THE EVIDENCE. HOWEVER, I DO NOT MEAN THAT YOU MUST ACCEPT ALL OF THE EVIDENCE AS TRUE OR ACCURATE. YOU ARE THE SOLE JUDGES OF THE CREDIBILITY OR BELIEVABILITY OF EACH WITNESS AND THE WEIGHT TO BE GIVEN TO THE WITNESS' TESTIMONY. IN WEIGHING THE TESTIMONY OF A WITNESS YOU SHOULD CONSIDER THE WITNESS' RELATIONSHIP TO THE PLAINTIFF OR THE DEFENDANT, THE WITNESS' INTEREST, IF ANY, IN THE OUTCOME OF THE CASE, THE WITNESS' MANNER OF TESTIFYING, THE WITNESS' OPPORTUNITY TO OBSERVE OR ACQUIRE KNOWLEDGE CONCERNING THE FACTS ABOUT WHICH THE WITNESS TESTIFIED, THE WITNESS' CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND INTELLIGENCE, AND THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE WITNESS HAS BEEN SUPPORTED OR CONTRADICTED BY OTHER BELIEVABLE EVIDENCE. YOU MAY, IN SHORT, ACCEPT OR REJECT THE TESTIMONY OF ANY WITNESS IN WHOLE OR IN PART.

ALSO THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE IS NOT NECESSARILY DETERMINED BY THE NUMBER OF WITNESSES TESTIFYING AS TO THE EXISTENCE OR NONEXISTENCE OF ANY FACT. YOU MAY FIND THAT THE TESTIMONY OF A SMALLER NUMBER OF WITNESSES AS TO A FACT IS MORE CONVINCING THAT [sic] THE TESTIMONY OF A LARGER NUMBER OF WITNESSES TO THE CONTRARY.

A WITNESS MAY BE DISCREDITED, OR WE USE THE LEGAL TERM IMPEACHED, BY CONTRADICTORY EVIDENCE BY A SHOWING THAT THE WITNESS TESTIFIED FALSELY CONCERNING A MATERIAL

MATTER, OR BY EVIDENCE THAT AT SOME OTHER TIME THE WITNESS HAS SAID OR DID SOMETHING OR HAS FAILED TO SAY OR DO SOMETHING WHICH IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE WITNESS' PRESENT TESTIMONY ON A MATERIAL POINT. IF YOU BELIEVE THAT ANY WITNESS HAS BEEN SO IMPEACHED, THEN IT IS YOUR RIGHT TO GIVE THE TESTIMONY OF THAT WITNESS SUCH CREDIBILITY OR WEIGHT, IF ANY, AS YOU MAY THINK IT DESERVES.

NOW, I HAVE REFERRED TO BURDEN OF PROOF A TIME OR TWO, I THINK, PREVIOUSLY DURING THE TRIAL AND PERHAPS IN THESE INSTRUCTIONS. THE BURDEN IS ON THE PLAINTIFFS, IN A CIVIL ACTION SUCH AS THIS, TO PROVE EVERY ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM BY WHAT WE CALL A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE.

A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE MEANS SUCH EVIDENCE WHEN CONSIDERED AND COMPARED WITH THAT OPPOSED TO IT HAS MORE CONVINCING FORCE AND PRODUCES IN YOUR MINDS A BELIEF THAT WHAT IS SOUGHT TO BE PROVED IS MORE LIKELY TRUE THAN NOT TRUE. IN OTHER WORDS, TO ESTABLISH A FACT BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE MEANS TO PROVE SOMETHING IS MORE LIKELY SO THAN NOT SO. SHOULD THE CONFLICTING EVIDENCE APPEAR TO BE EVENLY BALANCED SO THAT YOU CANNOT TELL WHICH SIDE IS MORE LIKELY, THEN YOU MUST DECIDE THE CASE AGAINST THE PARTY WHO BEARS THE BURDEN OF PROOF. EACH PARTY'S BURDEN OF PROOF REMAINS THE SAME THROUGHOUT THE CASE; THAT IS, IT NEVER CHANGES.

IN DETERMINING WHETHER ANY FACT IN ISSUE HAS BEEN PROVEN BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE, YOU SHOULD CONSIDER THE TESTIMONY OF ALL THE WITNESSES, REGARDLESS OF WHO CALLED THEM, AND ALL THE EXHIBITS, REGARDLESS OF WHO OFFERED THOSE EXHIBITS, INCLUDING ALL REASONABLE INFERENCES FROM THE TESTIMONY AND EXHIBITS AS SEEMS JUSTIFIED IN VIEW OF YOUR EXPERIENCE AND COMMON SENSE. IF THE PROOF FAILS TO ESTABLISH ANY ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF THE PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM, YOU SHOULD FIND FOR THE DEFENDANTS AS TO THAT CLAIM.

TO CORRECTLY DECIDE THE DISPUTED ISSUES, YOU MUST FIRST UNDERSTAND THE FEDERAL LAW THAT CONTROLS THE SPECIFIC ALLEGATIONS IN THIS CASE, AND I'LL NOW EXPLAIN THAT LAW TO YOU. THIS ACTION IS BROUGHT UNDER 42, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 1983. PLAINTIFFS CLAIM THAT DEFENDANTS VIOLATED SECTION 1983 OF TITLE 42 OF THE UNITED STATES CODE. THAT SECTION ENTITLES A PERSON TO SUE IN THIS COURT TO OBTAIN AN AWARD OF MONEY DAMAGES AGAINST ANYONE WHO UNDER COLOR OF STATE LAW OR CUSTOM INTENTIONALLY VIOLATES PLAINTIFF'S RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES.

IN THIS CASE, PLAINTIFFS CLAIM THAT DEFENDANTS VIOLATED THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE FREE FROM AN UNREASONABLE SEARCH OF

THEIR HOME AND ITS CONTENTS. ONLY UNREASONABLE SEARCHES ARE PROHIBITED BY THE CONSTITUTION. IN DETERMINING REASONABLENESS, THE DEFENDANTS CONDUCT MUST BE VIEWED IN LIGHT OF THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES EXISTING AT THE TIME OF THE SEARCH.

NOW, IN ORDER TO PROVE THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS, PLAINTIFF MUST PROVE BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE EACH OF THE FOLLOWING THREE FACTORS: FIRST, THAT THE DEFENDANTS INTENTIONALLY COMMITTED ACTS WHICH VIOLATED ONE OR MORE OF THE PLAINTIFF'S FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS; SECOND, THAT THE DEFENDANTS ACTED, QUOTE, UNDER COLOR, UNQUOTE, OF THE AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA; AND THIRD, THAT THE DEFENDANT'S ACTS WERE THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF DAMAGES SUSTAINED BY THE PLAINTIFFS.

NOW, IN THIS CASE THE PARTIES DO NOT CONTEST THAT THE DEFENDANTS WERE ACTING UNDER COLOR OF STATE LAW WHEN THEY SEARCHED PLAINTIFF'S HOME, AND YOU SHOULD THEREFORE ACCEPT THAT FACT AS PROVEN. ALSO YOU ARE INSTRUCTED THAT I HAVE RULED AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT DEFENDANTS POSSESSED A VALID ARREST WARRANT FOR STEVIE KING ON THE DAY OF THE ARREST.

THE FIRST ASPECT OF PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM THAT YOU MUST CONSIDER IS WHETHER DEFENDANTS SUBJECTED PLAINTIFFS TO AN UNREASONABLE SEARCH OF THEIR HOME. AS PREVIOUSLY STATED,

THE CONSTITUTION PROTECTS EVERY CITIZEN AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES, AND ORDINARILY THIS MEANS A SEARCH WARRANT MUST BE OBTAINED FROM A JUDICIAL OFFICER BEFORE ANY SEARCH OF A HOME CAN BE MADE.

THERE ARE, HOWEVER, CERTAIN EXCEPTIONS TO THIS REQUIREMENT. ONE SUCH EXCEPTION ARISES WHEN POLICE OFFICERS ARE ORDERED TO EFFECT THE ARREST OF A PERSON SUSPECTED OR VIOLATING THE LAW. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES IF THE OFFICERS HAVE A REASONABLE BELIEF THAT THE SUSPECT LIVES AT THE RESIDENCE AND THAT THE SUSPECT IS INSIDE, THE OFFICERS CAN ENTER AND SEARCH THE RESIDENCE FOR THE SUSPECT. TO APPLY THIS EXCEPTION YOU MUST DETERMINE WHETHER DEFENDANTS REASONABLY BELIEVED THAT STEVIE KING RESIDED AT PLAINTIFF'S APARTMENT AND WAS INSIDE THE APARTMENT AT THE TIME OF THE SEARCH.

ANOTHER EXCEPTION IS RECOGNIZED IN EMERGENCY SITUATIONS IN WHICH A LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER, IF HE HAS A REASONABLE AND GOOD-FAITH BELIEF THAT THERE IS A SERIOUS THREAT TO HIS SAFETY OR THE SAFETY OF SOMEONE ELSE, MAY ENTER AND MAKE A SAFETY INSPECTION FOR THE PURPOSES OF INSURING OR PROTECTING HIS WELL-BEING AND THE WELL-BEING OF OTHERS. THE CONSTITUTION DOES NOT BAR POLICE OFFICERS FROM MAKING A WARRANTLESS ENTRY INTO A PRIVATE HOME WHEN THEY REASONABLY BELIEVE THAT A PERSON WITHIN IS

IN NEED OF IMMEDIATE AID. YOU ARE INSTRUCTED THAT THE LAW REFERS TO A REASONABLE BELIEF THAT – WELL, IN THESE INSTRUCTIONS I HAVE REFERRED TO A REASONABLE BELIEF AND WHEN I HAVE DONE THAT, THAT MEANS FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES APPARENT AT THE TIME WOULD INDICATE TO A REASONABLE PERSON THAT THAT SITUATION EXISTS.

NOW, ALTHOUGH THERE ARE TWO DEFENDANTS IN THIS ACTION, IT DOES NOT FOLLOW FROM THAT FACT ALONE THAT IF ONE IS LIABLE BOTH ARE LIABLE. EACH DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO A FAIR CONSIDERATION OF HIS OWN DEFENSE AND IS NOT TO BE PREJUDICED BY THE FACT, IF IT SHOULD BECOME A FACT, THAT YOU FIND AGAINST THE OTHER. UNLESS OTHERWISE STATED, ALL INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN YOU GOVERN THE CASE AS TO EACH DEFENDANT.

AFTER CONSIDERING ALL OF THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED IN THIS CASE, IF YOU FIND THAT THE DEFENDANTS DID VIOLATE PLAINTIFF'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE FREE FROM AN UNREASONABLE SEARCH, THEN YOU MUST DECIDE WHETHER PLAINTIFFS SUFFERED ANY DAMAGE AS A DIRECT RESULT OF DEFENDANT'S ACTION.

NOW, AT TIMES I HAVE USED THE TERM "PROXIMATE CAUSE" IN THESE INSTRUCTIONS. AN INJURY OR DAMAGE IS PROXIMATELY CAUSED BY AN ACT OR A FAILURE TO ACT WHENEVER IT APPEARS FROM THE EVIDENCE IN THE CASE THAT THE ACT OR OMISSION PLAYED A SUBSTANTIAL PART IN

BRINGING ABOUT OR ACTUALLY CAUSING THE INJURY OR DAMAGE, AND THAT THE INJURY OR DAMAGE WAS EITHER A DIRECT RESULT OR A REASONABLY PROBABLE CONSEQUENCE OF THE ACT OR OMISSION. PUT ANOTHER WAY, THE DAMAGES TO BE THE PROXIMATE RESULT OF WRONGFUL CONDUCT – EXCUSE ME, PUT ANOTHER WAY, FOR DAMAGES TO BE THE PROXIMATE RESULT OF WRONGFUL CONDUCT, THE PLAINTIFF MUST SHOW THAT EXCEPT FOR SUCH CONDUCT THE DAMAGES WOULD NOT HAVE OCCURRED.

PLAINTIFFS HAVE THE BURDEN OF PROVING ACTUAL DAMAGES BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE. IN THIS CASE PLAINTIFFS ARE ASKING FOR AN AWARD OF DAMAGE TO COMPENSATE FOR PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS OF MENTAL ANGUISH, HUMILIATION AND LOSS OF REPUTATION. IF YOU FIND THAT PLAINTIFFS SUFFERED MENTAL OR EMOTIONAL DISTRESS, LOSS OF REPUTATION OR OTHER DAMAGES CAUSED BY AN UNREASONABLE SEARCH OF THEIR HOME, THEN YOU MAY AWARD SUCH DAMAGES WHICH FLOW NATURALLY FROM THE DEFENDANT'S ACTIONS.

REMEMBER THAT COMPENSATORY DAMAGES ARE TO BE BASED UPON THE ACTUAL INJURIES CAUSED BY THE DEPRIVATION OF A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT AND NOT UPON THE ABSTRACT VALUE OR IMPORTANCE OF THE RIGHT IN QUESTION.

WHERE MENTAL OR EMOTIONAL DISTRESS OR LOSS OF REPUTATION ARE PROVEN, THE COURT

CANNOT GIVE YOU ANY RULE BY WHICH TO MEASURE THE SPECIFIC AMOUNT OF DAMAGES RESULTING FROM SUCH AN INJURY. THIS IS A MATTER THAT IS LEFT TO THE CONSCIENCE, GOOD SENSE AND SOUND JUDGMENT OF THE JURY. YOU SHOULD NOT ACT UNREASONABLY THROUGH BIAS, PASSION OR SYMPATHY BUT SHOULD EXERCISE COMMON SENSE AND FIX AN AMOUNT OF DAMAGES THAT, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE EVIDENCE AND THE LAW, WOULD FAIRLY COMPENSATE PLAINTIFFS FOR ALL THE INJURIES SUFFERED.

IF YOU FIND THAT PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO A VERDICT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THESE INSTRUCTIONS BUT DO NOT FIND THAT PLAINTIFFS HAVE SUSTAINED ACTUAL DAMAGES – NOW IT IS ACTUAL DAMAGES THAT I HAVE JUST IN THE LAST FEW MOMENTS HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTING YOU WITH REGARD TO – BUT YOU DO NOT FIND THAT PLAINTIFFS HAVE SUSTAINED ACTUAL DAMAGES, THEN YOU MAY RETURN A VERDICT FOR THE PLAINTIFFS IN SOME NOMINAL SUM SUCH AS ONE DOLLAR.

NOW, ON THE OTHER HAND, IF YOU FIND THAT THE PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO EITHER ACTUAL OR NOMINAL DAMAGES, THEN YOU MAY CONSIDER PUNITIVE DAMAGES. IF YOU FIND THE DEFENDANTS WERE MOTIVATED BY AN EVIL MOTIVE OR INTENT, OR ACTED WITH A RECKLESS OR CALLOUS INDIFFERENCE TO PLAINTIFF'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, YOU MAY AWARD PUNITIVE DAMAGES. THE PURPOSE OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES IS TO PUNISH THE DEFENDANTS FOR MALICIOUS OR

GROSSLY WRONG CONDUCT AND TO DETER SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS. WHETHER YOU DECLINE TO AWARD PUNITIVE DAMAGES SHOULD BE BASED UPON WHETHER YOU FIND THAT THE DEFENDANTS WERE WILLFUL OR MALICIOUS IN VIOLATING PLAINTIFF'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, OR THAT THEIR ACTS WERE INTENTIONAL IN GROSS DISREGARD OF PLAINTIFF'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS. NOTE, THAT, EVEN IF YOU DETERMINE FROM THE EVIDENCE THAT AN AWARD OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES IS APPROPRIATE, YOUR VERDICT AT THIS STAGE OF YOUR DELIBERATIONS SHOULD NOT INCLUDE A SPECIFIC AMOUNT FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES; YOU'RE ASKED TO DETERMINE ONLY WHETHER PUNITIVE DAMAGES ARE APPROPRIATE.

IN CONSIDERING THE ISSUE OF PLAINTIFF'S DAMAGES, YOU ARE INSTRUCTED THAT YOU SHOULD ASSESS THE AMOUNT YOU FIND TO BE JUSTIFIED BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE AS FULL, JUST AND REASONABLE COMPENSATION FOR ALL OF THE PLAINTIFF'S DAMAGES, NO MORE AND NO LESS. DAMAGES CANNOT BE BASED ON SPECULATION BECAUSE ONLY THE DAMAGES THAT I HAVE DESCRIBED TO YOU ARE RECOVERABLE.

NOW, OF COURSE, THE FACT THAT I HAVE GIVEN YOU INSTRUCTION CONCERNING THE ISSUE OF PLAINTIFF'S DAMAGES SHOULD NOT BE INTERPRETED IN ANY WAY AS AN INDICATION THAT I BELIEVE THAT THE PLAINTIFF SHOULD OR SHOULD NOT PREVAIL IN THIS CASE.

NOW THAT CONCLUDES MY INSTRUCTIONS ON THE LAW THAT APPLIES TO THIS CASE. I HAVE SOME ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR YOU WITH REGARD TO YOUR DUTIES AS JURORS AND YOUR DELIBERATIONS, AND I'LL GIVE THOSE TO YOU AFTER I RECOGNIZE THE ATTORNEYS FOR THEIR CLOSING ARGUMENTS.

I WILL MENTION THIS, THOUGH, I WILL FURNISH YOU A TYPED COPY OF MY INSTRUCTIONS. I KNOW THIS IS A LOT OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW TO DIGEST BY HEARING ME ORALLY GIVE IT TO YOU, SO I WILL FURNISH YOU A TYPED COPY OF MY INSTRUCTIONS TO REFER TO DURING YOUR DELIBERATIONS.

[CLOSING ARGUMENTS]

ALL RIGHT, MEMBERS OF THE JURY, I WANT TO TALK WITH YOU JUST A MOMENT ABOUT YOUR DELIBERATION. WHEN YOU REACH A VERDICT, YOUR VERDICT MUST REPRESENT THE CONSIDERED JUDGMENT OF EACH JUROR. IN ORDER TO RETURN A VERDICT, IN OTHER WORDS, IT IS NECESSARY THAT EACH OF YOU AGREE WITH THE DECISION: YOUR VERDICT MUST BE UNANIMOUS.

IT IS YOUR DUTY AS JURORS TO CONSULT WITH EACH OTHER OR ONE ANOTHER AND TO DELIBERATE WITH A VIEW TO REACHING AN AGREEMENT, IF YOU CAN DO SO, WITHOUT VIOLENCE TO YOUR INDIVIDUAL JUDGMENT. EACH OF YOU MUST DECIDE THE CASE FOR YOURSELF BUT ONLY AFTER AN IMPARTIAL CONSIDERATION OF ALL OF THE

EVIDENCE IN THE CASE WITH YOUR FELLOW JURORS.

IN THE COURSE OF YOUR DELIBERATIONS DON'T HESITATE TO REEXAMINE YOUR OWN VIEWS AND CHANGE YOUR OPINION IF YOU ARE CONVINCED THAT IT IS ERRONEOUS. BUT DON'T SURRENDER YOUR HONEST CONVICTION AS TO THE WEIGHT OR AFFECT OF THE EVIDENCE SOLELY BECAUSE OF THE OPINION OF YOUR FELLOW JURORS OR MERELY FOR THE PURPOSE OF RETURNING A VERDICT.

REMEMBER AT ALL TIMES THAT YOU ARE NOT PARTISANS, YOU ARE JUDGES – JUDGES OF THE FACTS. YOUR SOLE INTEREST IS TO SEEK THE TRUTH FROM THE EVIDENCE IN THE CASE.

NOW, UPON RETIRING TO THE JURY ROOM YOU SHOULD FIRST SELECT ONE OF YOUR MEMBER TO BE YOUR FOREPERSON. YOUR FOREPERSON WILL PRESIDE OVER YOUR DELIBERATIONS AND WILL SPEAK FOR YOU HERE IN COURT WHEN YOU RETURN TO THE COURTROOM.

WE HAVE PREPARED A VERDICT FORM FOR YOUR CONVENIENCE. THE VERDICT FORM FIRST ASKS DO YOU FIND THAT THE DEFENDANTS OR EITHER OF THEM UNREASONABLY SEARCHED PLAINTIFF'S HOME ON MAY 23RD OF 1989. THERE IS A SPACE FOR YOU TO ANSWER EITHER YES OR NO TO THAT QUESTION, AND THERE ARE FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS DEPENDING ON HOW YOU ANSWER THAT QUESTION.

IF YOU FIND THAT THERE WAS NO UNREASONABLE SEARCH, AT THAT POINT YOUR FOREPERSON SHOULD DATE AND SIGN THE VERDICT FORM AND RETURN TO THE COURTROOM. IF YOU FIND THAT THERE WAS AN UNREASONABLE SEARCH ON MAY 23RD, 1989, THEN YOU SHOULD ANSWER THE FURTHER QUESTION. AND I HOPE THE VERDICT FORM AS WE HAVE TRIED TO MAKE IT CLEAR SO THAT YOU CAN FOLLOW IT, IF THAT IS, IN FACT, THE VERDICT THAT YOU REACH.

NOW, ONCE YOU HAVE REACHED A UNANIMOUS VERDICT, AS I SAID, YOUR FOREPERSON SHOULD DATE THE VERDICT FORM, SIGN THE VERDICT FORM AND YOU ALL SHOULD RETURN HERE TO THE COURTROOM FOR YOUR VERDICT TO BE RECEIVED IN OPEN COURT.

NOW, DURING YOUR DELIBERATIONS YOU MAY HAVE SOME QUESTIONS. I'M GOING TO ASK THAT IF YOU DO HAVE SOME QUESTIONS YOU REDUCE THOSE TO WRITING, GIVE THEM TO OFFICER WILLIAMS AND HE WILL BRING THEM IMMEDIATELY TO MY ATTENTION. I'LL TALK THEM OVER WITH THE LAWYERS AND WE'LL DECIDE WHAT THE BEST ANSWER TO YOUR QUESTION IS. IF IT IS A QUESTION I CAN ANSWER FAIRLY BRIEFLY, I WILL PROBABLY SIMPLY SEND YOU BACK A NOTE INTO THE JURY ROOM TO AVOID INTERRUPTING YOUR DELIBERATIONS. IF IT IS A QUESTION THAT REQUIRES A LITTLE MORE LENGTHY ANSWER, I MAY WELL ASK YOU TO COME BACK INTO COURT AND TRY TO GIVE YOU SOME FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS ORALLY.

I WANT TO GIVE YOU ONE WORD OF CAUTION, THOUGH, WITH REGARD TO YOUR DELIBERATIONS OR ANY MESSAGE OR COMMUNICATION THAT YOU MAY HAVE WITH ME, DON'T TELL ME HOW YOU – OR DON'T TELL ANYONE HOW YOU STAND DIVIDED ON ANY VOTE THAT YOU TAKE AS JURORS. IN OTHER WORDS, DON'T SAY, WELL, WE ARE SPLIT SO – LET'S SEE, FOUR TO THREE ON THIS QUESTION, OR SIX TO ONE ON THIS QUESTION. YOU SHOULD NOT DISCLOSE HOW YOU STAND NUMERICALLY DIVIDED ON ANY VERDICT OR VOTE THAT YOU MAY TAKE AT ANY TIME.